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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this dispute over dueling claims to Noerr-Pennington 
immunity, Simon Campbell and his organization, 
Pennsylvanians for Union Reform (collectively, “Campbell”), 
allege that the Pennsylvania School Boards Association and its 
Board Members (collectively, “PSBA”) violated Campbell’s 
civil rights by suing him in state court (the “State Suit”). That 
complaint asserted various tort claims against Campbell based 
on his persistent use of Pennsylvania’s Right to Know laws. 
According to PSBA’s State Suit allegations, Campbell’s 
relentless pursuit of information about PSBA, and his related 
conduct, was an abuse of the Right to Know statute intended 
solely to harass PSBA. At that time, Campbell defended 
against the State Suit by arguing his conduct was 
3 
 
constitutionally protected under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. 
 
Now Campbell sues, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, alleging that the State Suit was intended as retaliation. 
PSBA defends against Campbell’s civil rights claims by itself 
invoking Noerr-Pennington. It argues the First Amendment 
shields its right to sue in state court. The District Court agreed 
with PSBA and granted its motion for summary judgment.  
 
We conclude that the District Court erred in requiring a 
heighted burden of proof on PSBA’s motives in bringing its 
tort claims in state court. However, because we find that 
Campbell’s civil rights claim would fail under any standard of 
proof, we agree that PSBA is entitled to judgment as a matter 




Simon Campbell is an active and persistent user of the 
Pennsylvania Right to Know Law (“RTKL”), which permits 
citizens to obtain certain information from the state 
government and its agencies.2 In recent years, he has submitted 
hundreds of requests to public school agencies across the 
Commonwealth. Many of the recipients are members of the 
PSBA. The PSBA is a non-profit association created by 
Pennsylvania’s school districts “to further the interests of 
public education and to provide assistance to public school 
entities.”3 A majority of school boards in the state are 
members, and the organization’s roots stretch back to the 19th 
century.4  
 
Campbell founded Pennsylvanians for Union Reform 
(“PFUR”) in 2013 to “eliminate compulsory unionism in 
Pennsylvania while promoting transparency and efficiency in 
 
1 “We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by 
the record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citation omitted). 
2 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 67.101 et seq. (2008). 
3 App. at 1576. 
4 Id. at 1589. 
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government for taxpayers.”5 In pursuing those goals, PFUR 
has energetically utilized the Commonwealth’s RTKL to 
obtain records from PSBA’s constituent school districts and 
other government entities. In the process, it has litigated cases 
that have expanded the reach of that law.6 
 
In March 2017, PFUR turned its attention to the PSBA 
by sending RTKL requests to “most, if not all, public school 
agencies” in Pennsylvania.7 These requests sought contact 
information for district employees and union representatives. 
PSBA’s attorney, Emily Leader, responded by advising 
member school districts that they were required to release 
publicly available information, but they did not have to provide 
PFUR with private data such as personal email addresses.8 
PSBA later advised school districts that, although they were 
legally required to collate the requested information, they 
could simply make the results “available for pickup at the 
district offices,” rather than forwarding it to PFUR. It also 
presciently informed its members that this relatively 
uncooperative approach might lead to litigation.9 
 
When Campbell received copies of the PSBA’s legal 
guidance, he established a page on the PFUR website entitled 
“PSBA Horror” with a mocking photograph of PSBA 
Executive Director Nathan Mains. The photograph included a 
word bubble which read: “Taxpayers, thanks for the $226,000 
and the public pension! Now * * * * off, and drive to the school 
district if you want public records. And don't forget your check 
book.”10 Campbell had also requested PSBA’s tax returns. 
When Michael Levin, PSBA’s outside counsel, provided a link 
to those returns, Campbell caustically told Levin to “stay out 
of my business whenever I’m approaching one of your public 
 
5 Id. at 1587. 
6 See, e.g., Reese v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, 173 
A.3d 1143 (Pa. 2017); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. 
Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, Inc., 154 A.3d 431 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2017) (en banc). 
7 App. at 1632. 
8 Id. at 94-99. 
9 Id. at 109-113. 
10 Id. at 1546. 
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entity clients.” Levin responded by threatening to sue 
Campbell for defamation.11 
 
Campbell soon poured gasoline on this burgeoning feud 
by submitting a second wave of RTKL requests in May. 
Approximately 600 school boards across Pennsylvania 
received an identical 17-page request asking their respective 
districts to provide 27 different types of documentation 
regarding their relationship with PSBA.12 More than 240 of the 
school districts turned to PSBA for assistance in assembling 
that information. This overwhelming stream of requests led 
PSBA to adopt a policy of providing what it viewed as the 
minimum legally required response.13 Levin also sent 
Campbell a demand that he take down the picture of Executive 
Director Mains. Campbell complied, but replaced it with an 
illustration of PSBA alongside a message similar to the original 
text.14 Campbell also established a new website with his 
personal funds, www.psbahorror.com. He filled it with his 
anti-PSBA messaging through writing and videos he posted 
online.15 
 
Nathan Mains eventually told PSBA’s legal team that 
he wanted to sue Campbell for damaging PSBA’s reputation.16 
In June 2017, the PSBA Board voted unanimously to sue 
Campbell and the resulting state tort action was filed the 
following month alleging defamation, tortious interference 
with contractual relations, and abuse of process.17  
 
PSBA’s then-president testified that the State Suit was 
filed to “stop” PFUR from “harassing districts with . . . 
unreasonable request[s] [and] to stop defaming members of the 
organization.”18 Mains announced the suit in an email to all 
PSBA members.19 Later that year, Campbell and PFUR 
 
11 Id. at 1399-1401. 
12 Id. at 124-26. 
13 Id. at 1574, 1558. 
14 Id. at 1403. 
15 Id. at 1418, 1684. 
16 Id. at 1684. 
17 Id. at 780-831. 
18 Id. at 1825. 
19 Id. at 144. 
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removed all of the challenged content from their websites and 
stopped sending RTKL requests.20 
 
In February 2018, as the State Suit proceeded, Campbell 
filed this action against PSBA and ten members of its board. 
His complaint alleges that PSBA’s State Suit was motivated by 
an improper desire to retaliate against him for proper RTKL 
requests in violation of his First Amendment rights. Campbell 
seeks injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive 
damages.21 
 
PSBA moved for summary judgment. Its motion 
advanced multiple arguments, but we must consider only the 
claim that Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields PSBA from 
liability for filing the State Suit. The District Court agreed with 
this position and held that both Campbell’s RTKL requests and 
PSBA’s subsequent state tort claims were protected under 
Noerr-Pennington.22 The Court found that PSBA’s State Suit 
claims were objectively baseless. As we discuss later, this 
satisfied the first requirement for lifting Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. However, the District Court held that there was not 
clear and convincing evidence that the suit was “subjectively 
baseless.” 23 Accordingly, the Court granted PSBA’s motion 
for summary judgment and dismissed Campbell’s civil rights 





We review this summary judgment decision de novo, 
mindful of the special care called for by these issues of “free 
 
20 Id. at 1984. 
21 Id. at 56. 
22 Campbell v. Penn. Sch. Bds. Assoc., 336 F. Supp. 3d 482, 
494 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
23 Id. at 504. 
24 Because this is a civil rights case arising under the United 
States Constitution, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). On appeal, we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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expression.”25 As we noted at the outset, both sides seek shelter 
under Noerr-Pennington immunity. That doctrine shields 
constitutionally protected conduct from civil liability, absent 
certain exceptions.26 Specifically, the doctrine’s protective 
umbrella does not extend to “sham” suits, which seek to take 
advantage “of governmental process—as opposed to the 
outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon.”27 
The parties’ competing claims to Noerr-Pennington protection 
can more easily be resolved if we first examine the origins and 
history of the doctrine. 
A) Origins of Noerr-Pennington 
“The Noerr–Pennington doctrine takes its name from a 
pair of Supreme Court cases that placed a First Amendment 
limitation on the reach of the Sherman Act.”28 In Noerr,29 
railroad companies, fearful of the growing power of the 
trucking industry, sought to use their considerable resources to 
encourage adoption of laws and regulations that would 
encumber truckers. The truckers responded by suing the 
railroad companies for violation of the Sherman and Clayton 
Anti-Trust Acts.30 The case reached the Supreme Court, which 
held that the railroads’ First Amendment rights to petition the 
government must override statutory limitations on 
anticompetitive behavior. The Court explained: “The right of 
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, 
and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent 
to invade these freedoms.”31 The Court soon extended this 
protection to efforts to influence executive action in 
 
25 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
499 (1984) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
285 (1964)). 
26 Prof'l Real Estate Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. 
(PREI), 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). 
27 Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 123 
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting PREI, 508 U.S. at 61 (emphasis in 
original)). 
28 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, 806 F.3d 
162, 178 (3d Cir. 2015). 
29 E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127 (1961). 
30 Id. at 129; see 15 U.S.C. § 1, and 15 U.S.C. § 15, 
respectively. 
31 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138. 
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Pennington.32 There, the Court held that “efforts to influence 
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though 
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal . 
. .”33 The Court concluded that efforts to influence government 
action were protected from liability even if driven by an illicit 
intent.34  
There was, however, one conceivable exception. In 
Noerr, Justice Black had observed in dicta that an ostensible 
petition which in reality “is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor” would not deserve 
protection.35 The Court subsequently established a carve-out 
for such behavior. Noerr-Pennington protection does not 
extend to an objectively “[b]aseless suit [that] conceals an 
attempt to interfere directly with a competitor's business 
relationships, through the use [of] the governmental process—
as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an 
anticompetitive weapon.”36 This is referred to as the “sham” 
exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity. 
B) The Sham Exception 
“A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections 
to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation 
of achieving denial of the license but simply in order to impose 
expense and delay.”37 The difficulty, of course, comes in 
evaluating intent.  
We employ a two-part test to determine if the sham 
exception applies. First, the suit must be objectively baseless. 
“If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is 
reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is 
immunized under Noerr . . . .”38 Whereas “sham litigation 
must constitute the pursuit of claims so baseless that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect to secure 
 
32 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965). 
33 Id. at 670.  
34 Id. 
35 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
36 PREI, 508 U.S at 50 (third alteration in original) (emphasis, 
internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). 
37 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 
365, 380 (1991). 
38PREI, 508 U.S. at 60. 
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favorable relief.”39 The Supreme Court analogizes this inquiry 
to the common law tort of wrongful civil proceedings, which 
requires proof that the defendant (the plaintiff in the underlying 
action) lacked probable cause to bring that suit.40 Mere ill 
intent does not suffice: “a showing of malice alone will neither 
entitle the wrongful civil proceedings plaintiff to prevail nor 
permit the factfinder to infer the absence of probable cause.”41  
 
Thus, if probable cause exists, our inquiry is at an end. 
However, the fact that a suit may lack any objective merit is 
not itself determinative. We must then inquire into the 
plaintiff’s subjective motivations for bringing suit.42 We take 
this additional step to ascertain whether the actual motivation 
is to dragoon the “governmental process” itself into use as a 
competitive tool.43 In the economic realm, this often means 
examining “evidence of the suit’s economic viability.”44 The 
difficulty of proving subjective motivation obviously “places a 
heavy thumb on the scale” in favor of granting protection.45 
Only if these objective and subjective tests are satisfied is 
Noerr-Pennington protection lost and the suit permitted to 
proceed. 
  
The doctrine has now evolved well beyond its original antitrust 
confines.46 For instance, it shields constitutionally protected 
 
39 Id. at 62. 
40 Id. at 63 (citing Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 
(1879)); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT 
OF CONTRACT 182 (1879) (“[T]here must be such grounds of 
belief as would influence the mind of a reasonable person, 
and nothing short of this could justify a serious and formal 
charge against another.”). 
41 PREI, 508 U.S. at 63. 
42 Id. at 60-61. 
43 499 U.S. at 380 (emphasis omitted). 
44 PREI, 508 U.S. at 61 (emphasis in original). 
45 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC, 806 F.3d at 180. 
46 See Barnes Found. v. Township of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 
151, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2001) (summarizing the growth of the 
doctrine into new fields of law). 
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protesters from civil suits.47 It has also been applied by this 
Court and other courts of appeals to bar § 1983 claims by state 
actors based upon constitutionally protected conduct.48 That is 
the situation here. 
C) Noerr-Pennington for State Actors 
Nevertheless, Campbell urges a new rule. He suggests 
that state actors deserve less protection given their wide 
resources for combating falsities and special positions of 
public trust. He cites Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc. to support such 
a rule.49 There, the Supreme Court limited the reach of its 
“actual malice” libel standard to public figures, making it 
easier for private individuals to seek restitution.50 The Court’s 
analysis was influenced by the advantages public officials have 
in responding to libelous remarks, and by the “necessary 
consequences” of choosing to enter the public arena.51  
 
It is true that in other contexts, restrictions on 
government speech have been subjected to different degrees of 
scrutiny under the First Amendment than the speech of private 
citizens.52 That variability is compounded here because there 
 
47 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-08 
(1982). 
48 See Herr v. Pequea Township, 274 F.3d 109, 116-17 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (applying this rule, and summarizing similar 
holding across different circuits (citing Video Int’l Prod., Inc. 
v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns., Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 
(5th Cir. 1988))). 
49 Appellant’s Br. at 31 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974)). 
50 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
51 Id. at 344. 
52 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 
467-68 (2009) (“[I]t is not easy to imagine how government 
could function if it lacked this freedom. ‘If every citizen were 
to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds 
express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of 
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the 
private sector, and the process of government as we know it 
radically transformed.’” (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 
496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990))); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 




is some confusion over Noerr-Pennington’s applicability to 
state actors. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for 
instance, found it axiomatic that “Noerr-Pennington protection 
does not apply to the government, of course, since it is 
impossible for the government to petition itself within the 
meaning of the first amendment [sic].”53 
 
However, we have already declined to adopt that view. 
In Mariana v. Fisher, we stated: “[w]e know of no Supreme 
Court or federal appellate case holding that Noerr-Pennington 
cannot apply to government actors . . .”. 54 Indeed, it is difficult 
to envision how such a rule would operate. Stripping state 
actors of protection would expose them to an unreasonably 
increased risk of interference. It would uniformly tilt the 
playing field against them in arenas far removed from the Gertz 
context. That public figures hold enhanced capabilities in 
responding to libel claims was crucial to the holding there. We 
are unconvinced that government defendants seeking Noerr-
Pennington immunity receive similar benefits by virtue of their 
position. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been careful to 
extend rights to state actors in many fields, especially when 
they are acting as market participants.55 In some cases, the 
petitions of state actors will be “nearly as vital” as those of 
private individuals, given the representative role that public 
institutions play in democratic life.56 We therefore decline to 
adopt Campbell’s suggestion that PSBA is ineligible for 
Noerr-Pennington protection as a universal rule. 
  
This does not, however, suggest that that Noerr-
Pennington must necessarily be applied formulaically across 
 
to employment responsibilities . . . there is no relevant 
analogue to speech by citizens who are not government 
employees.”). 
53 Video Int’l Prod., Inc., 858 F.2d at 1086. 
54 338 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2003); see also, Herr, 274 F.3d 
at 119 (predicting the Supreme Court would permit municipal 
governments to receive Noerr-Pennington protection). 
55 See Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 
(2008) (describing the states freely entering the marketplace 
as level participants within the constitutional scheme). 
56 Manistee Town Center v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 
1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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every field of law. Indeed, some courts confine the doctrine to 
the antitrust realm, while recognizing a broader immunity that 
arises from the Petition Clause itself.57  
D) Standard of Proof 
 A different approach outside of antitrust makes 
particular sense when we consider the necessary standard of 
proof. A standard of proof is more than a legal barrier. It is “the 
degree of confidence our society thinks [a fact finder] should 
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular 
type of adjudication.”58 This standard may be allocated by 
Congress, or dictated by the Constitution, but where both are 
silent, “we must prescribe one.”59  
 
In In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, we 
explained that the Supreme Court has “indicated that the 
plaintiff in an antitrust suit has the burden of proving . . . ‘both 
the objective and subjective components of a sham’” when 
applying Noerr-Pennington. 60 We also explained that, in 
doing so, the Supreme Court “was silent,” as to whether that 
burden had to be satisfied by “clear and convincing evidence, 
or [by a] preponderance of the evidence.”61 However, since our 
analysis in Wellbutrin did not require us to decide which 
standard of proof was required to avoid Noerr-Pennington 
 
57 CSMN Invs., LLC v. Cordillera Metro. Dist., 956 F.3d 
1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2020) (“In this circuit, this immunity 
extends beyond antitrust situations. But we refer to it as 
Petition Clause immunity, reserving the name, Noerr-
Pennington, for antitrust cases.” (citation omitted)). 
58 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); see also id. at 371 (“Because the standard of 
proof affects the comparative frequency of . . . erroneous 
outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a 
particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect 
an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.”). 
59 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 
(1983). 
60 868 F.3d 132, 148 n.18 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 




immunity, we did not answer that question.62 Here, the District 
Court imposed the higher standard and required Campbell to 
prove the subjective component by clear and convincing 
evidence.  
 
As a general rule, the Supreme Court instructs that the 
heightened clear and convincing standard is necessary “where 
particularly important individual interests or rights are at 
stake.”63 Nevertheless, “imposition of even severe civil 
sanctions that do not implicate such interests has been 
permitted after proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”64 
Since Noerr-Pennington cases will necessarily involve 
constitutional rights, a clear and convincing standard initially 
seems appropriate. Indeed, many courts, including other circuit 
courts of appeals, have required that level of proof in patent 
disputes involving Noerr-Pennington immunity.65  
 
62 Id. (“Because our decision in this case does not hinge on 
the standard of proof, we leave that question for another 
day.”). 
63 Herman MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389. 
64 Id. at 389–90.  
65 See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 
Inc., 762 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burden [is] 
on the patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence . . .”); Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital 
One Fin. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 3d 691, 708 (D. Md. 2017) 
(finding that the “exception to Noerr–Pennington immunity is 
narrow, ‘[g]iven the presumption of patent validity and the 
burden on the patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 762 F.3d at 1343)) aff'd, 937 F.3d 
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 580 F. Supp. 2d 345, 362 (D. Del. 2008) (“To invoke 
the ‘sham’ exception, a defendant must prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that a plaintiff's activities were not 
really efforts to vindicate its rights in court.”); In re Relafen 
Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349, 360 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(observing that under patent law, “[p]laintiffs must establish 




In the past, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
has required clear and convincing proof in patent disputes.66 
But patents raise a special set of concerns. Because of the 
innovation and commercial viability that they encourage, 
courts have afforded suits to enforce patents a presumption of 
good faith.67 It naturally follows that a higher standard of proof 
is needed to overcome that presumption. The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit explains, “[t]he road to the Patent Office 
is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex,” that 
“no less than [c]lear, convincing proof of intentional fraud 
involving affirmative dishonesty” would suffice in patent 
cases.68  
 
This case by contrast, arises in the § 1983 realm, and it 
necessarily reflects a different tension. A balance that makes 
sense in the patent or antitrust context holds less weight for 
civil rights litigants, and vice-versa. This is because antitrust 
disputes must generally strike a balance between First 
Amendment rights and statutory restrictions on 
anticompetitive behavior. Justice Black was unwilling in such 
scenarios to “lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade” 
the First Amendment right to petition.69 Here, by contrast, 
PSBA and Campbell both seek to vindicate their constitutional 
right to petition. Thus, we cannot simply transplant the 
standard of proof used to balance a statutory and a 
constitutional right in order to resolve this clash of matching 
constitutional ones. We are also reluctant to require a 
heightened standard of proof here since patent litigation 
involves a presumption of good faith.70 No such presumption 
arises here.71 Instead, we have a face-off between two identical 
 
66 See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 762 F.3d at 1345; C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 
1573, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
67 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards I), 601 F.2d 
986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979). 
68 Id. 
69 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138. 
70 Handgards I, 601 F.2d at 996. 
71 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found such 




interests. The collision produces “an undeniable tension.”72 It 
would be “intolerable [if] one constitutional right should have 
to be surrendered [or restricted] in order to assert another.”73 
 
A heightened standard fails to account for those 
fundamental constitutional rights, which here are advanced by 
both sides. As already noted, the District Court required 
Campbell to establish his First Amendment claim here by clear 
and convincing evidence. The patent context’s presumption of 
good faith formed the backdrop for that decision. The Court’s 
analysis rested in large part upon FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., which 
involved an FTC action against a series of sham patent 
lawsuits.74 The district court in AbbVie relied heavily on the 
fact that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof in patent 
litigation.75 
 
 Instead of relying on patent law, we look to the relevant 
standard of proof for the constitutional claims being brought 
here. In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected efforts to impose a higher standard of proof on § 1983 
litigants.76 There, a deeply divided en banc Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit had imposed a heightened clear and 
convincing standard of proof for adjudicating a claim under § 
1983. The court reasoned: “If a heightened standard of proof—
clear and convincing evidence—was a sound remedy in the 
area of public figure defamation, we think it is equally so in the 
cognate area of officer damage liability for constitutional torts 
. . .”77 
 
Noerr-Pennington itself represents a defensive mechanism for 
defendants: “by requiring a plaintiff to prove that a 
defendant's conduct was a sham, the Supreme Court has 
already struck a rough balance between the competing First 
Amendment and antitrust interests.” Litton Sys., Inc. v. Am. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 813-14 (2d Cir. 1983). 
72 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). 
73 Id. 
74 FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 98, 106 (E.D. Pa. 
2018). 
75 See, e.g., Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP, 762 F.3d at 1345. 
76 523 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1998). 
77 Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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The Supreme Court disagreed. It rejected an across-the-
board elevation of the standard of proof for civil rights claims. 
The Court cautioned that a higher standard of proof “carries a 
high cost” for “plaintiffs with bona fide constitutional 
claims.”78 The Court explained that Congress has shown itself 
perfectly capable of increasing the burden of proof in specific 
areas (for prison litigation, for example).79 “Neither the text of 
§ 1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear 
and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the 
summary judgment stage or in the trial itself.”80  
E) The § 1983 Context 
 In 1871, Congress created what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
as a tool to combat racial discrimination.81 Today it is a 
bulwark of liberty, permitting citizens to seek relief when the 
government, or its agents, wrong them.82 However, such 
plaintiffs must surmount several intentionally erected hurdles. 
“To establish any claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) the conduct at issue was committed by a 
person acting under the color of state law, and (2) the 
complained-of conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured 
under the Constitution or federal law.”83 These limitations 
have been carefully adjusted in recent decades.84 For instance, 
 
78 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595-96.  
79 Id. at 596-97. 
80 Id. at 594; see also Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (permitting a “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard for claims arising under federal “civil 
rights laws”). 
81 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-77 (1985) (“By 
providing a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights, 
Congress hoped to restore peace and justice . . . through the 
subtle power of civil enforcement.”). 
82 Id. at 278 (finding § 1983’s protections “are contained in 
the Bill of Rights and lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
83 Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 n.6 
(3d Cir. 2019). 
84 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
694-95 (1978) (titrating the first requirement); Davidson v. 




municipal defendants receive the benefit of heightened fault 
standards, designed to avoid “open[ing] municipalities to 
unprecedented liability under § 1983.”85 Plaintiffs must 
contend with an individual state actor’s possible entitlement to 
different forms of immunity.86 In addition, only certain 
remedies are allowed.87  
 
A potential § 1983 litigant must therefore navigate an 
obstacle course erected to protect against a flood of grievances 
that could deter government actors from their duties.88 Erecting 
yet another obstacle by requiring proof by clear and convincing 
evidence would threaten that careful legislative and judicial 
balance of competing priorities. The Supreme Court reached 
precisely this conclusion in Crawford-El. There, the Court 
reasoned that a heightened standard of proof in civil rights 
disputes, “lacks any common-law pedigree and alters the cause 




85 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). 
86 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) 
(“Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit 
against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a 
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's 
office.”). 
87 Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675–77 (1974) 
(affording sovereign immunity to § 1983 claims for 
retrospective relief), with Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 
(1991) (permitting suits against state officials in their 
individual capacities). 
88 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) (recognizing 
the “balance between compensating those who have been 
injured by official conduct and protecting government's 
ability to perform its traditional functions”); Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (reflecting upon the 
“attempted balancing of competing values” inherent to 
inquiries into subjective intent). 
89 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595. 
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Accordingly, we have repeatedly held preponderance of 
the evidence to be the proper standard for § 1983 claims.90 Our 
model jury instructions so instruct the District Courts.91 In 
imposing this heightened standard of proof where both sides 
sought to vindicate First Amendment rights, the District 
Court’s approach fails to appreciate the distinction between 
First Amendment rights and patent rights insofar as the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is concerned. Because there is no 
“[s]upport for imposing a clear and convincing burden of 
proof” on a § 1983 claim,92 proof by a preponderance of the 




The District Court carefully inquired into Campbell’s 
claims and found they were not objectively baseless. 
Accordingly, the Court held that Campbell was entitled to 
Noerr-Pennington protection. The Court also reasoned that the 
actions that gave rise to PSBA’s state tort claims were 
obviously protected by the First Amendment, and PSBA’s suit 
 
90 See, e.g., Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (“To prevail on a First 
Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . the 
government may avoid liability if it can show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the 
adverse action even in the absence of the protected conduct.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Goodwin v. Conway, 836 
F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Wilson v. Russo, 212 
F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)); Reichley v. Penn. Dep’t of 
Agric., 427 F.3d 236, 244 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The plaintiffs have 
the burden of establishing liability under § 1983 by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
91 Third Circuit Court of Appeals Model Civil Jury 
Instruction 4.3 (2019) (“[Plaintiff] must prove both of the 
following elements by a preponderance of the evidence . . 
.”) (emphasis added). United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 
208 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have a hard time concluding that the 
use of our own model jury instruction can constitute error . . . 
.”). 
92 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594. 
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was therefore not objectively baseless.93 Nevertheless, the 
Court still afforded Noerr-Pennington immunity to the State 
Suit because Campbell had not produced clear and convincing 
evidence that PSBA’s state claims were “subjectively 
baseless.” 
 
Our standard of review of that decision is de novo.94 We 
will accept for the purposes of this appeal the District Court’s 
well-reasoned conclusion—drawing all inferences in 
Campbell’s favor at summary judgment—that Campbell’s 
RTKL related conduct was not baseless. Because the 
underlying activity was constitutionally protected,95 we also 
accept the District Court’s conclusion that PSBA’s State Suit 
is objectively baseless, as the First Amendment protected all of 
Campbell’s alleged activities. Campbell’s activities here could 
not reasonably be construed as defamatory given his 
allegations and the plausible state actor status of PSBA.96  
 
93 The parties disagree about whether the District Court 
concluded that PSBA is a state actor. While that court 
properly reserved judgment on the question, it did determine 
that PSBA is at least a limited public figure and therefore had 
to establish Campbell’s actual malice in the State Suit for it 
not to have been objectively baseless. See U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 938-39 
(3d Cir. 1990) (discussing the factors relevant to classification 
as a limited public figure). 
94 Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“We review a district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district 
court applied.”). 
95 A fact that PSBA tacitly acknowledged by pleading “actual 
malice” in both its initial and amended complaints in the State 
Suit. App. 428, 699. Had it not been aware of its own public 
status, this heightened standard would not have been 
necessary for culpability. 
96 The District Court detailed how each of Campbell’s actions 
against PSBA (including the insulting depiction of its 
Executive Director, Nathan Mains, on a website entitled 
“PSBA Horror”) had some factual basis, whether obtained 
through RTKL responses or other sources. Further, Mains and 
others at PSBA had constructive notice of their public status, 
introducing a high bar for defamation claims to succeed. 
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The dispositive question that remains is whether 
PSBA’s State Suit was also subjectively aimed at interfering 
with Campbell’s constitutionally protected conduct.  
 
We agree that Campbell cannot satisfy the subjective 
prong under the clear and convincing standard. He has failed 
to establish PSBA’s: (1) indifference to the outcome of the suit, 
(2) insufficient potential recovery to justify bringing the State 
Suit, or (3) that PSRB “decided to sue primarily for the benefit 
of collateral injuries inflicted through the use of legal 
process.”97 Campbell’s evidence amounts to PSBA’s 
statements, conduct, and choice of attorneys. This evidence 
does not speak to whether PSBA intended the process itself, 
rather than its outcome, to achieve its goals. This is not 
enough.98 
 
As we have explained, the District Court’s clear and 
convincing standard imposed too high of a burden on 
Campbell. We nevertheless will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment to PSBA because Campbell’s 
evidence here is insufficient to strip PSBA of Noerr-





Under that lesser standard, Campbell’s evidence needed 
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that PSBA 
intended the State Suit as “use of governmental process—as 
opposed to the outcome of that process” as a “weapon.”99 We 
consider the evidence he offers: first, the statements of PSBA 
and its members before filing the suit, and second, the manner 
in which PSBA pursued the suit. 
A) PSBA’s statements 
Campbell argues strongly that PSBA’s own words 
reveal its motivation in bringing the State Suit “was all about 
protecting [PSBA’s] members” and making Campbell’s 
alleged “harassment of school districts stop.”100 He argues that 
 
97 PREI, 508 U.S. at 65. 
98 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139. 
99 PREI, 508 U.S. at 50 (emphasis in original). 
100 App. at 1497, 1510-11. 
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PSBA was motivated to “tak[e] legal action on behalf of its 
membership.”101 He claims his incessant flood of RTKL 
requests was causing difficulties for the targeted school 
districts, and PSBA intended its suit as a mechanism to 
terminate his RTKL requests. Campbell points to statements 
from Nathan Mains that PSBA was developing “a significant 
response” as proof that the organization sought to squelch his 
activities.102 He argues that the appreciation of grateful school 
districts after Campbell’s requests ceased proves that this was 
PSBA’s objective in filing the State Suit.103  
 
Indeed, PSBA did sue Campbell to get him to stop his 
RTKL-related conduct and PSBA never attempted to disguise 
or deny that objective. It criticized Campbell’s prolific use of 
the RTKL requests in its filings before the District Court. In 
one such filing, PSBA argued: “Campbell is using the RTKL 
as if he were back in London standing atop his soapbox in Hyde 
Park.”104 Campbell argues that when he continued filing RTKL 
requests, PSBA amended its complaint to add his new 
activities in a further effort to silence him.105  
B) PSBA’s actions 
Second, Campbell argues that PSBA used the legal 
process to punish him. He claims the attempt to punish him 
began before filing the State Suit, when PSBA demanded that 
he remove the parody of Nathan Mains and desist from further 
“defamatory” statements.106 Then, when the State Suit was 
filed, PSBA’s attorneys requested Campbell retain documents 
from the past seven years. But there is nothing punitive about 
asking an opposing party to preserve documents relevant to 
litigation, and we will not here attempt to erect some kind of 
time restriction on such a request. Moreover, Campbell’s 
argument that such a request was intended to be punitive is 
laden with irony given the voluminous records requests 
Campbell has repeatedly directed at school boards across the 
state. 
 
101 App. at 312. 
102 App. at 140. 
103 App. at 155, 163. 
104 ECF No. 18 at 15. 
105 Appellant’s Br. at 53. 
106 App. at 138. 
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Finally, Campbell claims PSBA’s motives were laid 
bare by its distribution of the State Suit complaint to its 
members, though it contained claims that were later discounted 
as untrue, and by PSBA’s settlement demand that Campbell 
stop attacking PSBA and its staff.107 
C) Analysis 
 At summary judgment, we are charged with viewing 
Campbell’s evidence “in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment, and resolv[ing] all reasonable 
inferences in that party’s favor.”108 Yet even under this 
deferential standard, we cannot discern a single quantum of 
evidence, amidst the mountain of facts that Campbell provides, 
that would support a conclusion that PSBA aimed to use the 
process of the suit, as opposed to a successful outcome, to 
accomplish its objective: ending Campbell’s RTKL onslaught. 
We readily agree that PSBA’s eagerness to achieve this goal 
radiates from each incident he complains of. However, that 
does not prove that the suit itself, as opposed to prevailing on 
the merits, was PSBA’s subjective motivation. 
 
Indeed, the record indicates that PSBA wanted 
Campbell to stop overwhelming its members with RTKL 
requests and that it filed the State Suit in hopes of 
accomplishing that goal. The fact that PSBA readily accused 
Campbell of defamation, that it sought to terminate his 
activities, and that it celebrated its progress in achieving that 
goal simply fails to satisfy the subjective prong, even by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
 
PSBA’s leadership harboring personal animus against 
Campbell does not establish that the State Suit was subjectively 
baseless. If animus alone were the test, it would readily devour 
the rule, since litigation is rarely sparked by feelings of warmth 
and amity. The protection of Noerr-Pennington immunity 
cannot be swept away by simple dislike. 
 
Accordingly, Campbell simply cannot satisfy the 
subjective prong by a preponderance of the evidence. Because 
this case must be decided on the record before us at summary 
 
107 App. at 173-74, 303-04, 1484-86. 
108 Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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judgment, “[w]e need not remand to the District Court to 




For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 
109 In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 306 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat'l 
Bank & Tr. Co., 93 F.3d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996) (“An 
appellate court has the power to decide cases on appeal if the 
facts in the record adequately support the proper result . . .”)). 
